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Abstract: Payments for forest environmental services (PFES) is a major breakthrough policy in the 
Vietnamese forestry sector because it contributes 25% of the total investments in the forestry sector and 
serves as the first market-based instrument employed to protect forests. However, there is little empirical 
evidence of its effectiveness. Is the policy meeting the core objectives of improving forest cover and forest 
quality and is it also achieving its claims of supporting local livelihoods? This paper analyses the 
environmental, social, and economic impacts of PFES in Son La province, the longest standing 
implementation of a PFES scheme in Vietnam. Our study uses a sampling method that incorporates pre-
matching and a before-after-control-intervention approach. Data was collected from government statistics, 
remote sensing analysis, focus group discussions involving 236 people, surveys with a total of 240 
households, and key informant interviews with 45 people. Our findings show that additionality of PFES in 
Son La is controversial and depends on who collects the data and what data is used to evaluate the impacts 
of PFES. Data collection is also politicized to serve central, provincial and district government interests. 
Evidence shows that PFES has provided little additional income to individual villagers to protect forests in 
Son La. However, total PFES revenue paid to communities generates significant income for village 
communities. Moreover, not all villagers can receive continuous payments from PFES, meaning that PFES 
has not become a stable source of income, rendering the permanence of PFES limited. Improving monitoring 
and evaluation policies coupled with transparent, inclusive, independent mechanisms are essential to 
providing a more accurate reflection of impacts from PFES in Vietnam.  
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1. Introduction 
Payment for forest environmental services (PFES) is one of the major forestry policies in 
Vietnam as it contributes 25% of the total annual investment in the forestry sector since 2008 (Pham 
et al., 2018). PFES aims to enhance forest cover and forest quality, improve local livelihoods and 
reduce state investment in the forestry sector (Pham et al., 2018). The public pays environmental 
services fees through water and electricity bills to hydropower plants and water supply companies. 
These intermediaries then transfer the payment to the Forest Protection and Development Fund, 
which acts as a government intermediary for paying and monitoring forest owners to protect 
forests. Although PFES implementation began in earnest in Vietnam since 2008, there are only a few 
rigorous assessments of PFES impacts on people's lives (e.g. Duong & de Groot, 2018; Duong & de 
Groot, 2020; Pham et al., 2015; Trædal & Vedeld, 2017; Wichelns et al., 2016; Tran et al., 2016) and 
furthermore, there is limited empirical evidence on forest quality outcomes. More broadly, payment 
for environmental services (PFES) schemes, including the PFES in Vietnam, is only shown to be 
effective if there is well-evidenced additionality, such as improved forest conservation effects and 
improved local livelihoods compared with the predefined baselines (Mohebalian & Aguilar, 2016; 
Wunder, 2007). This paper aims to address the knowledge gaps on PFES by using Son La province as 
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an empirical case study by examining the impacts of PFES on the livelihoods of local people and 
forest protection. Document No. 129, issued in 2017 by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Development (MARD) and Vietnam Forest Protection and Development Fund, provides guidelines 
on monitoring and evaluation protocols, as well as corresponding assessment criteria for PFES in 
Vietnam. These assessment criteria are grouped into three themes: environmental (forest cover), 
social, and economic impacts of PFES. This paper follows the government monitoring and evaluation 
framework by asking three key questions: i) Has PFES led to increased forest cover and reduce 
deforestation? ii) Has PFES led to increased household income? and iii) Has PFES led to 
improvements in social conditions in Son La? For each question we examine the ways in which 
changes have occurred. 
Evaluating PFES impact requires going beyond monitoring indicators by also understanding its 
additionality, namely: the difference between PFES environmental outcomes compared with the 
baseline in the absence of PFES, which also takes into account anticipated changes in external 
factors during the period when PFES were established, and elements that may affect Environmental 
Service provider activities (Angelsen, 2017; Le Velly & Dutilly, 2016; Naeem et al., 2015; Wunder, 
2005;). In this paper, we not only analyze PFES impact against government frameworks but also 
analyze the additionality of PFES compared with a business as usual scenario. Furthermore, although 
accurate understanding of PFES impact also depends on the availability and accuracy of data, data 
is also influenced by the interests of powerful agents (Brockhaus and Angelsen, 2012; De Sy et al., 
2018). PFES monitoring systems are generally seen as a technical matter, while what is measured, 
reported, and verified, how and by whom, are politically driven (Gupta et al., 2012; Gupta et al., 
2014). Therefore, rather than accepting available data on PFES impact at face value, this paper also 
adopts a political lens to analyze the politics of numbers related to PFES. We do this by extending 
research questions to incorporate dimensions of who analyzes the data, how the data is collected, 
and which interests are being served. 
Son La was selected as the case study site to assess PFES impact in Vietnam for several reasons. 
First, the impact of PFES on forest ecosystem services are more valid with longer-term temporal and 
longitudinal data (Gupta et al., 2012; Gupta et al., 2014; Hasan et al., 2019; Jebiwott, 2016; Wang et 
al., 2020). Son La, as one of the first two provinces to conduct PFES in Vietnam (from 2008 to the 
present), provides more than a 10-year timespan to evaluate PFES impact. Moreover, the 
complexity and cost of monitoring and evaluation depends greatly on the variety of forest 
environmental services, the number of forest owners, the complexity of forest management 
practices, as well as local economic, social and political conditions. Forests account for 65.4% of the 
total natural area of the province and are currently managed by 54,000 forest owners (Son La Forest 
Protection and Development Fund, 2018). Therefore, as one of the most diverse provinces across 
the abovementioned factors, Son La provides opportunities to account for many valuable lessons 
learned on the design of monitoring and evaluation systems, and presents a pathway for studying 
the broader impact of PFES in Vietnam and beyond. The paper is structured into five sections. After 
the Introduction, Section 2 describes the methods employed in our study. Section 3 presents 
findings relative to the research questions in distinct sub-sections for: environmental impact 
(Section 3.1), economic impact (Section 3.2), social impact (Section 3.3) and also presents results as 
a politics of numbers (section 3.4). The discussion section then contextualizes findings in the broader 
literature, followed by conclusions that highlight implications for PFES. 
2. Methods  
Data were collected between August 2016 to June 2018 and included a wide range of research 
methods. PFES impact depends particular attention on monitoring the unit of scale (Wunder, 2005; 
Engel, 2016). In our study, we assessed PFES impact at provincial, district, commune and village 
levels. The Government of Vietnam uses environmental indicators to assess PFES, including forest 
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area, forest cover, forest loss, number of forest violation cases, combined with economic indicators 
including household income, and incorporating social indicators, including number of poor 
households that benefit from PFES and number of households that engage in PFES programs (Pham 
et al., 2015; Pham et al., 2018). We complement this Government data collection by compiling from 
across different data sources to analyze how indicators have changed over time, which further helps 
to evaluate PFES impact at different governing scales.  
The primary data source collection was guided by four overall approaches, particularly with an 
eye towards analyzing the impact of PFES at provincial, district, and commune levels. First, 
government reports and statistical records on forest area, forest cover, forest loss, number of forest 
violations were collected and analyzed for Son La. Second, annual and biannual PFES reports 
beginning in 2010 were collected from the Son La Forest Protection and Development Fund, which 
is the main government focal point implementing PFES in the province. In addition, annual reports 
from hydropower plants and water supply companies (Environmental Services users in Son La) were 
reviewed to document any impacts since the implementation of PFES in 2008, in terms of forest 
cover, forest areas under PFES scheme, number of beneficiaries, and water quality as proxy for 
monitoring PFES impact. Third, as government reports and statistics on environmental and socio-
economic indicators applied by MARD used to evaluate PFES are not all available for different 
periods, we also complemented our analysis by using Hansen data on forest cover loss and forest 
cover gain to develop a clearer understanding of PFES impact. Although Hansen data might not be 
the same with government data, the findings are consistent with the trend of forest cover gain and 
forest cover loss in the area over time. Fourth, from October 2016 to August 2017, we conducted 
semi-structured interviews with representatives of 21 departments and agencies in Son La province 
and 3 representatives were from service users. These interviews aimed to understand the 
institutional setting and context of PFES implementation in Son La, particularly under the various 
environmental, social, and economic impacts of PFES at provincial, district and commune levels. As 
PFES has been implemented across Son La and in all districts and communes, we analyzed impacts 
of PFES by comparing indicators of before and after PFES. PFES was piloted in Son La in 2008, but 
only in 2009 did PFES begin implementation across the entire province. Therefore, 2009 was chosen 
as a comparison point before and after PFES in Son La.  
To understand PFES impact at the village level, we used the Before - After - Control - 
Intervention method (BACI) developed by Sunderlin et al., (2016). BACI is considered a robust 
method of analysis to improve the accuracy of evaluations of impact at the village level (Bos, 2020). 
To determine the exact matching pairs, we carried out three steps. First, we reviewed government 
reports on socio-economic development and forest protection in Son La and the biannual and 
annual reports from the Son La Forest Protection and Development Funds since 2008 to the present 
and identified a list of possible matched sites. We chose control and intervention sites to ensure 
that they are the same in some key aspects such as ethnicity, economic status, deforestation 
pressures, market and road accessibility, social background, and that they are subject to the same 
influence such as drivers of historical land use, historical forest governance structure, land tenure, 
presence of external projects (except PFES initiatives). We then consulted with five provincial 
government agencies on these potential lists on how representative these sites were and whether 
the sites are accessible for a research team to work in the area. Secondary data review and 
consultation was further carried out with five provincial government agencies, a pool of 15 
candidate interventions and 15 control villages were selected. These sites are located in Muong 
Sang, Chieng Khua and Dong Sang communes of Moc Chau district, which were selected to represent 
diverse socio-economic conditions in Son La (e.g. ethnic group, different forest owners and user 
groups, economic status and forest condition) and based on willingness to participate in the study 
of local villagers and local authorities (Figure 1).  
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Figure 1. Studied sites 
Table 1. Studied sties  















80 26 100 130 86 131 
Total forest 
areas (ha) 




0 7 0 9 59 42 
Dominant 
Ethnicity  
Kinh H’Mông Kinh Kinh, Thái H’Mông Kinh, Thái 
  
We then conducted field visits to verify the sites and narrowed down the list of potential sites 
before identifying a sub-set of matched intervention and control villages that have similar 
characteristics. In reality, a matched control and intervention village cannot be completely similar 
in terms of its environmental, institutional, social and economic context, but we tried to match 
similar features as much as possible. Based on secondary data, consultation results and field visits, 
the research team chose two control sites and four intervention sites that reflect key influential 
criteria. Following Sunderlin et al.,’s (2016) approach to select four intervention sites and four 
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control sites, we further modified the approach because there were only two sites that could 
function as control sites in the study area, as all other villages were already engaged in PFES. As a 
result, we only have two control sites and four intervention villages (Table 1).  
In each village, focus group discussions were conducted with men and women groups (Table 
2). These discussions focused on the drivers of deforestation and degradation, local socio-economic 
conditions where PFES is implemented, impacts of PFES on forests and local livelihood, with 
particular emphasis on exploring the strengths and weaknesses of PFES.  
Table 2. Number of participants in the in-depth group discussion 
Village Men Women 
Bản Lùn 12 12 
Thái Hưng 13 13 
An Thái 10 12 
Bản Phách  12 12 
Bản Trọng 12 12 
Căng Tỵ 12 12 
Total 71 73 
 
Household surveys were also conducted in six villages covering a total of 240 households (Table 
3). These household surveys aimed to understand the nature of households characteristics, such as 
number of family members, ethnicity, and educational background, engagement in PFES (length of 
contract, participation in PFES or not) and household perceptions on changes before and after PFES 
in terms of forest resources, access to the forest, household income, and participation in forest 
conservation schemes.  
We also collected and reviewed data on PFES contracts, PFES payment and PFES areas at the 
intervention sites, which we obtained from the Son La Forest Protection Fund, as well as the 
commune people’s committee reports on forest status, forest protection programs implementation 
and policies, as well as socio-economic development in both intervention and control villages. This 
data was used to analyze any potential impacts that can be attributed to PFES.  
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3. Findings 
3.1 Environmental impact 
To assess the environmental impacts of Son La, indicators used by government officers 
included: changes in forest areas and forest loss at the provincial, district, commune and village 
level, such as considerations of deforestation and forest fire conditions. In this paper, we present 
findings on changes in forest areas at the provincial level in section 3.1.1., scaling to the district level 
in section 3.1.2, then to the commune level in section 3.1.3 and finally the village level in section 
3.1.4.  
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3.1.1 Changes in Forest areas at the provincial level 
 The additionality of PFES in enhancing forest area in Son La at the provincial level can be 
seen differently depending on what data is used. Hansen data on annual loss of forest cover in Son 
La from 2001 - 2019 shows limited additionality of PFES in reverting forest cover loss trends as there 
is no change before and after PFES. The annual loss of forest cover since 2009 when PFES began 
increased sharply before dropping again in 2012 and has gradually began to increase again since 
then (Figure 2). According to government agencies interviewed, this sharp increase in annual forest 








Figure 2. Annual forest cover loss in Son La 2001- 2016. Source: Hansen et al. (2016)  
Table 4 further confirms that although before the PFES period total forest cover loss was only 
45,037.8 ha between 2001- 2008, since PFES began implementation in 2009, total forest cover loss 
increased from 45,037.8 to 55,474.5ha.  
Table 4. Annual provincial forest cover loss and total forest cover loss between 2001 - 2016 
Annual Forest cover loss 
(ha/y) 
Total forest cover loss 
(ha) 
Annual Forest cover 
loss 
Total forest cover loss 
(ha) 
2001-2008 2001-2008 2009-2016 2009-2016 
5,629.7 45,037.8 6,934.3 55,474.5 










Figure 3. Forest area in Son La Province from 2008-2018 (ha). Sources: Son La Forest Protection and 
Development Fund (2018); Son La Forest Protection Department (2018); Son La Statistics 
Department (2018). 
 

























In contrast, data collected and published by different government agencies show PFES 
additionality by presenting figures on increased forest cover, reduction in the number of 
deforestation cases, and declining area of cleared forests. Figure 3 presents government data on 
forest areas in Son La and these datasets show PFES additionality increasing forest area at the 
provincial level at a range of 20,000 ha of forests to 70,000 ha of forests, depending on which 
government agency data are used. 
Moreover, according to provincial statistics, PFES additionality is well-demonstrated by the 
government through the number of deforestation cases and deforestation areas fluctuating over 
time, and which gradually decreased (Figure 4). Before PFES, the number of cases in Son La in 2008 
was 1,000 but dropped to less than 50 cases in 2015. Most government staff interviewed claimed 
that this might partly be because of PFES but could also be attributed to the government 
implementing multiple forest protection and poverty reduction programs in the province, thus 












Figure 4. Deforestation in Son La province over the years. Source: Son La Forest Protection and 
Development Fund 2018 
However, data published by government agencies (Figure 5) also indicates limited additionality 
of PFES in reducing forest loss and cases of forest fire, as both the documented area of forest loss 
and incidence of forest fire cases gradually increased over time. 
 
 
Figure 5. Number of forest fire cases and forest area loss due to fire over years 2010 – 2015. Source: 
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According to an interview with staff at the Son La Forest Protection and Development Fund, 
these increases in forest loss were due to fires, which is also mainly attributed to the naturally dry 
weather during that period. However, interviews with other government agencies also revealed 
other causes for the increasing number of fires, such as due to expanding agricultural production 
encroaching into forests.  
Although PFES implementation in Son La began since 2008, the actual land allocation process 
to define the forest boundary took a long time, which resulted in actual payments beginning only in 
2011. Data published by the Son La Forest Protection and Development Fund also shows that despite 
an increase in forest areas under PFES schemes in Son La increasing between 2011- 2015, forest 
areas also fell slightly from 2016 - 2018 (Figure 6). 
 
 
Figure 6. Forest area paid under PFES scheme (2011-2018) (Unit: ha). Source: Son La Forest 
Protection and Development Fund 2018 
The decrease in PFES area as explained by the Son La Forest Protection and Development Fund 
was due to changes in forest definitions resulting in some areas not being eligible to receive PFES. 
This is also consistent with Figure 2 which also shows that the overall forest area in Son La province 
increased between 2008 to 2013 but slightly declined in 2014 - 2015 (Son La Forest Protection and 
Development Fund 2018; Son La Statistics Department 2018). This decrease in forest area is mainly 
due to the change on national forest definitions, which took place in 2013. Before 2013, forests were 
defined as 10% of tree cover. However, Decision No. 689/QĐ-TCLN-KL dated 23/12/2013 issued by 
VNFOREST regulated that not only do forests needs to have 10% tree cover, but timber volume also 
needs to be above 10 m3, which led to a large area of newly regenerated forests not fulfilling this 
criterion. Moreover, according to interviewees with the Son La Forest Protection and Development 
Fund and the Son La Forest Protection Department, previous monitoring techniques were manually 
conducted, and results were inaccurate. The current measurement method is supported by high-
resolution satellite imagery in combination with on-the-ground surveys to identify and assess forest 
area, quality, and volume, thus increasing the overall accuracy and eliminating areas without forests. 
3.1.2 Changes in Forest areas at the District Level  
Similar to findings at the provincial level, the additionality of PFES at the district level also varied 
depending on what data was used to make the assessment. Hansen data shows that after PFES was 
implemented in Moc Chau district, annual forest loss slightly declined between 2010-2014 before 
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Figure 7. Annual loss of forest cover in Moc Chau district 2001- 2016 (ha). Source: Hansen data 
(2016) 
Table 5 also shows that PFES has limited additionality and impact in Moc Chau district because 
total forest cover loss increased from 3,661.8 ha between 2001- 2008 (before PFES started in Moc 
Chau) to 4,991.8 ha after PFES (between 2009- 2016). 
 
Table 5. Moc Chau annual forest cover loss and total forest cover loss 2001- 2016 
Annual Forest cover loss 
(ha/y) 




Total forest cover 
loss (ha) 
2001-2008 2001-2008 2009-2016 2009-2016 
457.7 3,661.8 624.0 4,991.8 
Source: Hansen et al. 2016  
The Hansen data is also consistent with data published by the Son La government statistics 
department, which indicated that forest areas in Moc Chau increased only slightly from 2010 to 
2012 followed by a sharp decline from 2012 to 2015 (Figure 8). Meanwhile, the Son La Forest 
Protection and Development Fund argues that this reduction is due to changes in forest conditions 
and monitoring techniques. Some provincial authorities admitted that this decrease is due to forest 
conversion from the expansion of fruit tree plantations in recent years. 
 
 
Figure 8. Forest area in Moc Chau district 2010-2015. Source: Son La Statistic Department 2016  
3.1.3 Changes in forest areas at the Commune level 
There is no publicly available data from government agencies on forest areas in the communes 
of Muong Sang, Dong Sang and Chieng Khua. Therefore, our assessment at the commune level was 
mainly based on accessing the Hansen data. Figure 9 shows presents the data, and given that PFES 
began in Son La in 2009, the three studied communes indicate gradual overall reductions in annual 
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Figure 9. Annual forest cover loss in Đông Sang, Chiềng Khừa and Mường Sang communes 
Table 6 shows that before PFES (years 2001 - 2008), the annual forest cover loss in Muong Sang 
commune was 9.1 ha/year, but since PFES was introduced, losses declined to 7.8ha/year. Similarly, 
in Dong Sang commune, before PFES (2001 - 2008), the annual forest cover loss was 6.9 ha/year but 
declined to 4.9 ha/year after PFES implementation in 2009. In contrast, Chieng Khua commune 
annual forest cover loss increased slightly, from 30.6 ha/year before PFES (2001 - 2008) to 
32.3ha/year after PFES began in Son La.  
According to interviews with Dong Sang and Muong San commune government officers, annual 
forest lost decreased in these two communes because government programs such as PFES provided 
financial support for communities to protect forests. They also shared another important factor, 
namely the arrival of access to electricity. This has had an influence in transitioning away from 
firewood as the main source of energy for cooking sources. In contrast, Chieng Khua commune has 
promoted the goal of expanding agriculture and fruit gardens as part of their poverty reduction 
strategy (Dung Minh, 2018). Illegal logging and high rates of deforestation in Chieng Khua commune 
has also been widely reported in the mass media (Mùi Sơn & Minh Hải, 2019; Vietnam 
Administration of Forestry, 2013; Son Ha, 2019). 
Table 2. Annual forest loss at commune levels between 2001 – 2016 
 
Annual Forest 
cover loss (ha/y) 
Total forest 
cover loss (ha) 
Annual Forest 
cover loss (ha/y) 
Total forest 
cover loss (ha) 
2001-2008 2001-2008 2009-2016 2009-2016 
Mường Sang 9.1 73.2 7.8 62.6 
Chiềng Khừa 30.6 245.0 32.3 258.4 
Đông Sang 6.9 55.5 4.9 39.5 
Source: Hansen et al. (2016)  
 
3.1.4 Changes in forest areas at the village level 
Changes in forest areas at control and intervention sites are assessed by analyzing available and 
published data and are also based on household perceptions from interviews inquiring into changes 
in forest areas before and after PFES. Hansen data is not available at the village level and there is no 
available and published data from government agencies on forest area at the control sites. 
According to interviews with forest rangers and provincial government staff, data on forest cover at 
the village level are not regularly collected by government, and if collected, results are recorded 
mostly based on forest ranger estimates rather than through an actual inventory. According to 
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annual forest area. The lack of systematic data means that additionality of PFES is more difficult to 
ascertain.  
Data availability at intervention sites on forest area are only collected and published by the 
Forest Protection and Development Fund, which commenced after PFES programming began. 
According to interviewed staff, data on forest area in these villages are only available because the 
Fund needs to monitor forest area over time to justify payments to households. In this regard, the 
contribution of PFES not only creates financial incentives for forest managers to protect forests, but 
also helps to improve forest monitoring and evaluation, as well as enhancing data transparency in 
Son La. 
Data availability on forest area under PFES schemes in the four intervention villages from 2009 
to 2018 were obtained from the 180 household interviews at the intervention sites. A household 
can benefit from PFES in two ways. First, they can sign a PFES contract with the Son La Forest 
Protection Fund as an individual consultant if they have a certificate for forest land use. Second, a 
community can sign a PFES contract with the Son La Forest Protection and Development Fund as a 
community member and these households can take part in and benefit from PFES. In our study, 73 
out of the 180 households received PFES payments as individual households, and 107 households 
received PFES payments directed at community forest protection (Table 7). 
Table 7. PFES payments to individual households and community members at the 4 intervention 
sites 
 Total Ban Lun Thai Hưng Phach Cang Ty 
No. of HH receiving direct 
PFES payments to individual 
households 
73 23 13 33 4 
No. of HH receiving PFES 
payments through joining 
community forest 
protection and management 
programs 
107 37 17 27 26 
Source: Analysis from household surveys 
 
The published data available on forest area in PFES villages for both community forests and 
individual forests show that the PFES forest area in the 4 intervention villages fluctuated over time. 
Cang Ty and Thai Hung have less fluctuation compared to Phach and Ban Lun villages (Figure 10). 
There is a slight increase in the forest area in Thai Hung and Cang Ty villages overtime since PFES 
began in 2009. Ban Lun and Ban Phach also witnessed a sharp increase in forest cover after PFES 
was initiated but then experienced a sharp decline after 2013. This shows that PFES has had a 
minimal effect in increasing forest cover in Thai Hung and Cang Ty, while it has had no effect in 
preventing forest loss in Ban Lun and Ban Phach. 
Amongst the 73 individual households who obtain payments by PFES for their individual forests, 
data from the Son La Forest Protection and Development Fund (Table 8) show that most forest areas 
receiving payments by PFES declined or fluctuated overtime. This shows not only the unstable 
impacts of PFES but also the little additionality and effect of PFES schemes at the individual 
household level.  
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Figure 10. Forest areas that in 4 intervention villages between 2009- 2018 (Unit: ha). Source: Son La 
Forest Protection and Development Fund 2018 










Total number of HH receiving PFES  
payments as an individual 
73 23 13 33 4 
Number of HH receiving PFES for only 1 year in 
2018 
6 3 2 0 1 
Number of HH that have forest areas paid by 
PFES increasing over time 
10 3 1 5 1 
Number of HH that have forest areas paid by 
PFES decreasing over time 
20 5 3 10 2 
Number of HH that have forest areas paid by 
PFES remains the same over time 
4 1 1 2 0 
Number of HH that have forest areas paid by 
PFES fluctuating overtime: Increased in some 
years and decreased in other years 
33 11 6 16 0 
Source: Analysis from household survey 
Table 9. Local perceptions on forest clearing between before and after PFES (Unit: percentage of 
household interviewed) 
 Intervention sites Control sites 
Have never cleared or stopped 
clearing forests after PFES 
78.8 78.5 
Clear more forest since PFES 1.0 0 
Clear forests at the same rate before 
and after PFES 
1.6 0 
Clear less forests after PFES is 
implemented 
4.3 0 
Unanswered 14.1 21.4 
Source: Analysis from household’s survey 
When comparing household perceptions on changes in terms of forest area before and after 
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In all PFES villages, 88% of total villagers interviewed claimed that forest area remained the same 
before and after PFES, while 98% of total villagers interviewed at the control site felt this way. When 
comparing forest quality before and after PFES, 59% of total households surveyed at intervention 
sites perceived improved forest quality, while only 30% of total households surveyed in control sites 
were of the same mind. Table 9 thus shows that PFES has had little additionality in reducing forest 
clearing as only 4.3% of total households interviewed at intervention sites claimed that they have 
reduced forest clearing after PFES.  
3.2 Economic impacts 
The Government of Vietnam assesses PFES impact through the central issue of improving local 
income. Provincial and commune government agencies claimed that before PFES, both intervention 
and control sites only received payment for forest protection with payment levels at 50,000 VND/ha 
under the National Reforestation Program (Program 661). When Program 661 ended in 2010, 
household interviews in control sites indicated that they did not receive any payment for forest 
protection while households interviewed in intervention sites received PFES payments.   
3.2.1 Contribution of forestry and PFES to overall household income 
In all studied villages, regardless of whether at intervention or control sites, all villagers 
interviewed received income from forestry. However, the average income generated from forestry 
(including PFES) at the intervention sites are 2.31 times higher than in the control site (Table 10).  In 
the villages without PFES, respondents indicated that the highest income households could obtain 
from forestry is VND 8 million, while the max figure is VND 10 million in villages with PFES. In both 
villages with PFES and without PFES, the average income from forestry accounts for a very small 
proportion compared to other sources, especially agriculture. Moreover, when compared before 
and after PFES, 76% of households interviewed in all four intervention villages and all households 
surveyed in control villages indicated there had been no change in income since PFES was instituted.  
Table 10. Percent of interviewed households with different sources of income (N = 240) and the 
average income from different sources in 2017 
Income source Villages with PFES 
(N= 180 households) 
Villages without PFES 
(N= 56 households) 
% total income Average 
income 
(Million VND) 
% total income  Average income 
(Million VND) 
Agriculture 79 55.4 92.6 64.13 
Forestry  1.78 1.25 0.78 0.54 
Business  14.34 10.06 5.26 3.64 
Salary 3.29 2.31 0.65 0.45 
Other 1.59 1.15 0.71 0.38 
Total 100 70.17 100 69.14 
Source: Results from household survey 
Survey respondents could not recall their exact income 10 years ago when PFES first began but 
all of them claimed that despite income differences between these time periods, the overall 
contribution of income from forestry remain unchanged before and after PFES.  
Table 11 shows that total forestry revenues in both villages with PFES and without PFES come 
from multiple sources. However, revenue from firewood and timber is the main source of income 
for many households, while PFES contributes only a very small portion of overall income. Income 
from firewood is 4 times higher and income from bamboo and bamboo shoots is 7.34 times higher 
than income from PFES. As a result, those who received PFES payments indeed benefited from 
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additional income from forestry, but they also indicated that the additional sum is not very 
significant.  
Table 11.  Annual income sources from forestry 
 Village with PFES Village without PFES 
Households (% 









PFES 33.6 0.95 0 0 
Timber 29.9 Not available 17.9 Not Available 
Firewood 42.4 1.74 33.9 0.4 
Bamboo, bamboo 
shoots 
4.3 3.16 1.8 Not Available 
No income 22.4 0 46.4 Not Available 
Source: Analysis from household’s survey 
When comparing before and after the PFES period, more people in intervention sites perceived 
that their livelihood and income improved after PFES was instituted compared with the control sites 
(Table 12). These interviewed households claimed that PFES created additional income for local 
people.  
Table 12. Local perceptions on improving livelihood and income before and after PFES. 
Intervention sites Control sites 
Thai Hung  Cang Ty  Ban Lun  Ban Phach  An Thai Ban Trong  
53.3% 23.5% 33.3% 38.3% 3.3% 26.9% 
Source: Analysis from household’s survey 
Table 13. Average income of households and contribution of PFES in overall income from studied 
villages (2017) 
Village Average income 
(VND/household/year)  
Average income from PFES 
(VND/household/year) 
The ratio of income from PFES to 
total income (%) 
Intervention sites 
Bản Căng Tỵ            16,000,000  778,270 5% 
Bản Phách            13,000,000  1,091,587 8% 
Bản Lùn            30,000,000  735,438 2% 
Bản Thái 
Hưng  
          35,000,000  509,436 1% 
Control sites 
Bản An Thái            28,000,000                             -    0% 
Bản Trọng           20,000,000                             -    0% 
Source: People's Committee of Moc Chau District (2018), People's Committee of Dong Sang (2018), 
People's Committee of Muong Sang (2018), People's Committee of Chieng Khua (2018) 
According to annual reports published by the Moc Chau District People’s committee (2018); 
Chieng Khua Commune People’s Committee (2018); Muong Sang Commune People’s committee 
(2018); and Dong Sang Commune People’s committee (2018), annual income generated from PFES 
payments ranged from VND 402,156/household (USD 17/household) to VND 2,276,661/households 
(USD 98/household) (Table 7).  Average household income in the two control sites (An Thái và Bản 
Trọng villagers) are higher than the four intervention sites (Thai Hung, Ban Lun, Cang Ty, Ban Phach) 
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(Table 7). According to interviews with provincial and commune government agencies, the average 
income in both control and intervention sites has not changed much before and after PFES, although 
there is no available published data on annual household incomes. Income from PFES contributes 1 
- 8% of total income for people at intervention sites (Table 13) . 
Income from PFES depends on forest areas that each household claims, and most of the time 
these consist of relatively small areas, amounting to less than 1 ha (see Figure 11). As a result, 
payments for households is very limited.  
 
 
Figure 11. PFES area managed by households interviewed in 4 intervention villages. Source: Forest 
Protection and Development Fund 2018 
3.2.2 Continuity and stability of payments 
During the focus group discussions, respondents indicated that although payment and 
contributions of PFES is small, if payments are regular and continuous, the amounts provide an 
important source of income for local people and can serve as a strong incentive for communities to 
take part in PFES. Nevertheless, while at the community level PFES payments for community forests 
are regular and continuous between the 2009-2018 period, PFES payments to individual households 
were uneven. Specifically, 56 out of 73 (76.7%) households received interrupted PFES payment 
between 2009 – 2018. Most of these households received PFES payments for a few years and then 
did not receive anything from PFES for a couple of years thereafter. According to officers 
interviewed from the Forest Protection and Development Fund, this is because of poor protection 
mechanisms or direct violations from households, resulting in the Fund making a decision not to pay 
them. At intervention sites, in Thai Hung and Na Un villages, 83% of the interviewed households 
claimed that despite receiving PFES, their forest areas decreased, which they attributed to flooding 
and landslides, and as a result, villagers needed to clear forests to expand agriculture areas. Most 
households interviewed also claimed that the PFES payments are too low. A villager shared that:  
 
We received about 2 million VND/year but if we convert forest to corn production, we can 
earn at least 60-70 million per year.  
 
Most households receiving PFES for individual forests received an increasing or fluctuating 
amount of PFES payment over time, as presented in Table 14.  
72
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Table 14. Changes in PFES payments to households between 2009 - 2018 in four intervention sites 
 Total Na Lun Thai Hung Phach Cang Ty 
Total number of individual HH 
receiving PFES 
73 23 13 33 4 
Number of HHs only receiving PFES 
payments for 1 year in 2018, 
therefore cannot be compared 
9 4 2 1 2 
Number of HHs receiving increased 
PFES payments over time 
28 12 8 7 1 
Number of HHs receiving decreased 
PFES payments over time 
1 0 1 0 0 
Number of HHs that received 
fluctuating payment over time 
35 7 2 25 0 
 
Only 8.2% of total households received PFES payments for two continuous years and only 1.4% 
of total households received PFES payments for five years of continuous PFES payments showing 
very low additionality of PFES in providing stable income for villagers. This also shows that forest 
areas that are maintained or expanded over a long period is very limited at our study sites (Table 
15). 









Phách Căng Ty 
Total number of individual HH 
receiving PFES 
73 23 13 33 4 
Interruption –HH receiving PFES 1 or 2 
years, no payments in years 3-4, and 
then later receiving PFES payments 
again 
56 17 10 27 2 
Number of HH only receiving PFES for 
1 year 
9 4 3 1 2 
Number of HH receiving PFES 
continuously for 2 years 
6 2 0 4 0 
Number of HH receiving PFES 
continuously for more than 5 years 
1 0 0 1 0 
Source: Authors analysis based on Forest Protection and Development Fund 2018 
3.2.3 Contribution of PFES to community funds and household income for forest protection 
Of the total interviewed households in the four intervention villages, the number of households 
receiving PFES continuously since 2009 accounted for only a small number (20% in Thai Hung village; 
23.3% in Na Lun village, 45% in Phach village and 3.3% in Cang Ty village). This thus suggests that 
PFES revenue is only a stable source of income for a small number of households.  
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Figure 12 shows that while PFES payments to individual households are small, PFES payments 




Figure 12. Amount paid to different PFES recipients in surveyed villages in 2017. Source: Son La 
Forest Protection and Development Fund (2018) 
Moreover, while individual households experienced interrupted payments from PFES program, 
Figure 13 shows that PFES payments to communities are continuous and tend to increase over time 
in most cases.   
 
 
Figure 13. PFES payment to communities in four intervention sites 
3.3 Social impacts 
PFES social impacts are assessed by the Government of Vietnam based on the number of 
individual households and communities paid under the PFES program, the number of households 
(particularly the poor) that receive benefits from PFES, and the engagement in forest conservation 
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and groups of households) receiving PFES funds has increased over the years. From 2013 – 2015, 
the entire province used PFES money to build over 2,689 projects with a total investment of over 
57,970 billion VND.  
 
 
Figure 14. The number of PFES forest owners. Source: Son La FPDF 2017 
Table 16. Number of poor households with income from PFES in the studied villages between 2009 
- 2017 
Village Total number of 
HH 
Total number 
of poor HH 
Number of HH 
with income from 
PFES  
Number of poor 
HH with income 
from PFES  
Intervention sites 
Bản Căng Tỵ 86 59 63 59 
Bản Phách 131 42 121 42 
Bản Lùn 130 9 64 9 
Bản Thái Hưng 100 0 39 0 
Control sites 
Bản An Thái 80 0 0 0 
Bản Trọng 26 7 0 0 
Source: People's Committee of Dong Sang (2018), People's Committee of Muong Sang (2018), 
People's Committee of Chieng Khua (2018) 
Our findings also show some impacts of PFES on poverty reduction. Interviewed officials from 
provincial government agencies claimed that before PFES was implemented, budget limitations 
meant that less than 10% of poor households could be included in conservation programs as the 
provincial government would prioritize the households with good educational backgrounds and 
those that had the labor force to implement the program, which is a more difficult proposition for 
poorer households to gain access to the program. However, according to the data reported by the 
People’s Committees of 3 communes – Chieng Khua, Muong Sang and Dong Sang, PFES 
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received income from PFES. According to commune data, in all studied villages, 100% of the poor in 
the village are eligible to receive payments from PFES (Table 16). The only village without any poor 
people receiving PFES (Thai Hung) is because there are no poor households listed in that village. 
Focus group discussions in all four intervention villages show that while PFES can only contribute to 
1-5% of the income among higher- and medium-income households, payments can also contribute 
up to 12% of poor household income. 
In terms of engagement in forest conservation programs, the number of households 
participating in forest protection in the form of community forest management is relatively 
unchanged before and after PFES in both intervention and control villages. Because all villages set 
up forest management and protection groups to patrol and protect the forest, villagers are 
compelled to take part regardless of whether they have PFES funding or not. PFES plays little 
additionality in this regard (Table 17).  
At our study sites, there are other existing government programs such as poverty reduction 
programs and the 30A program, which supports local people in mountainous regions and also pays 
local people for forest protection efforts. This creates difficulty in assigning attribution and proving 
the additionality of PFES.  
3.4. Political dilemmas of numbers 
Throughout the research engagement we began to realize the importance of the politics of 
numbers in data collection, presentation, and analysis. We therefore began to inquire into aspects 
related to PFES by asking who collects data and how data is collected, analyzing connections to the 
interest being served by a particular approach to engaging with the data.  
National and provincial data on PFES are collected quarterly and annually, and this is only 
conducted by government agencies. There are three different government agencies that collect data 
and report on PFES impacts in Son La, including the Son La Forest Protection and Development Fund, 
the Son La Statistics Department, and the Son La Forest Protection Department (Figure 3). However, 
these agencies only have expertise and mandates to collect data on forest status, violation cases, 
PFES payments, and payment distribution. Data on socio-economic indicators and impact of PFES, 
such as the contribution of PFES to household incomes, has not been collected by government 
agencies since PFES began in 2009. 
Furthermore, these three government agencies collect data using different approaches and 
reporting timelines, leading to inconsistent data on PFES impact. For example, the Son La Forest 
Protection and Development Fund needs to report on forests in December, while the Son La Forest 
Protection and Department reports forest area data in February, and the Son La Statistics 
Department publishes data on forest area in June. This difference in reporting timelines results in 
different conclusions about PFES impact. For example, a provincial government interviewee shared 
that:  
The Forest Protection Department has a very limited budget for monitoring and evaluation, 
so most figures on forest areas are based on previous year statistics and modified by forest 
protection officers with their own predictions. Recently the province has received technical 
support on remote sensing and spatial analysis but the data between 2009 - 2017 are poorly 
collected and analyzed by the Forest Protection Department. In contrast, the Son La Forest 
Protection and Development Fund has assigned staff,and instituted more secure and regular 
funding support to conduct ground truthing to verify forest areas in the field. This will lead 
to more accurate and reliable figures on forest areas.  
Another provincial agency interviewed added: 
The Son La Statistics Department collects data on forest cover and socio-economic           
conditions through two sources: reports from the Forest Protection Department and other 
provincial agencies, complemented by their own survey during every quarter. These data 
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sources are then combined and verified first by the Provincial People’s Committee to 
determine whether the data reflect provincial commitments and meet political targets. If the 
data do not reflect provincial targets and goals, they will be revised.  
As a result, although data on PFES is produced in different ways by different government 
agencies, how the data is selected, analyzed, and presented depends on provincial political goals 
that these data need to serve. A provincial interviewee further elaborated as follows:  
Although we know that data provided by the Son La Forest Protection and Development 
Fund is more accurate, government authorities cannot use them as official data. According 
to our existing institutions, the Son La Forest Protection Department is the only authorized 
agency to collect and inform data on forest cover for the central government. Nevertheless, 
the final word should come from the Provincial Statistics Department because these figures 
need to reflect political objectives of the provincial leaders. We might collect and submit 
data to the Provincial Statistics Department, but how the data is finally chosen and published 
is not within our authority. 
At a smaller governing scale, a district government respondent shared their data reporting 
dilemmas in the following ways: 
What can we do when the party wants us to show that forest cover has to increase over time 
and still requires us to increase agricultural production activities by expanding agricultural 
land? We are standing in the crossroads and are very worried that we are under high risk of 
going to jail. We cannot make payments based on the wrong data on forest areas because 
if central inspectors find out, we will be punished. However, as provincial governments need 
to show evidence of positive changes in forest cover, provincial leaders asked us to only 
report increased forest cover over time.  
Another government officer further described the political context of agricultural development 
pressures relative to PFES by stating: 
We all know that Son La is the largest corn producer in Vietnam but in statistical records, we 
are only ranked as the 2nd or 3rd largest corn producers. This is because corn production 
comes at the cost of forests, but nobody wants to acknowledge this fundamental fact 
because we also want to highlight our achievements in forest protection. 
4. Discussion 
The effectiveness of PFES depends on its additionality, namely how the situation would be 
different in its absence (Bottazzi et al., 2018; Vedel et al., 2015). Implementing a PFES program 
without monitoring and proving its additionality would reduce the scheme’s efficiency and 
stakeholder confidence in the effectiveness of PFES (Bennett, 2010; Karsenty et al., 2017). Globally, 
effectiveness of PFES schemes is difficult to assess due to the lack of data, leading to divergent 
results (Pagiola et al., 2013). Our findings mirror similar findings from research globally, as the lack 
of available data on forest cover and household income before and after PFES makes it is difficult to 
fully confirm PFES additionality. There is no available baseline data on PFES implementation in 
Vietnam in general, nor in Son La in particular, which further undermines the accuracy and rigor of 
PFES impact assessments.   
Furthermore, even when data is available, politics can influence data collection approaches, 
processes, and outcomes (Rose, 1991; Alonso and Starr, 1987). As we have also shown, data can be 
designed to meet actors’ defined political objectives (Eichelberger, 2012), and official statistics can 
function as an outcome of sociopolitical processes (Desrosières, 2010; Rosa da Conceição et al., 
2018). The fact that the published official data is further filtered by political leaders in Son La sheds 
additional accuracy challenges in determining the reliability of results on PFES impact as it reflects a 
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particular government agenda in demonstrating the increase in forest cover over time. As a result, 
where data might affect political promotion and result in sanctions of certain government actors 
related to PFES, data is carefully manufactured and presented to protect their interests. This finding 
is similar to other programmatic target reporting processes as uncovered in the case of reporting on 
swidden areas by Pham et al., (2018), which also showed that Son La government authorities do not 
select and report data on swidden as it implies the government did not do a good job in eliminating 
deforestation. Strengthening technical capacity and funding for rigorous data collection is therefore 
insufficient to ensure PFES transparency and deliver evidence-based analysis on PFES impact 
because it requires concurrently addressing the underlying politics of how data is collected, 
manufactured, and reproduced.  
The fact that government agencies are both PFES implementers and responsible agencies to 
report on performance of PFES and consists of the only source of data also reveals weak 
accountability and transparency in PFES. There is therefore a need to have independent monitoring 
and evaluation systems with the participation of various actors involved in the PFES schemes, such 
as environmental services providers, environmental services users, and multiple government 
agencies that perform checks and balances that support data verification to enhance data 
accountability and transparency. As PFES has environmental and socioeconomic objectives, data on 
PFES should not be collected solely by PFES agencies but must also integrate existing national 
monitoring and evaluation systems in the government to establish and monitor the adequate 
criteria and evaluation of socioeconomic factors. Information on agents of deforestation and forest 
degradation can also be a powerful tool for civil society to hold agencies to account for their actions 
(De Sy et al., 2018). Open source of information such as the Hansen data incorporated into 
monitoring systems as we have done in this study can also provide an independent assessment on 
PFES impact, especially to account for reductions in annual forest loss. Indeed, our findings show 
clearly that PFES has not been able to reverse the annual forest loss at the provincial, district and 
commune levels in Son La. Our study sites highlight that payments are not based on baselines, but 
rather paid on the basis of an activity being implemented. However, the fact remains that people 
still receive higher payments despite their failure in protecting existing forests, and more 
importantly, creates no incentives and conditionality for local people to continue to protect forests.  
The current PFES monitoring system only focuses on reporting on forest cover and there is no 
attempt to compile and make data available on forest quality. Vietnam has yet to introduce any 
requirements or protocols for environmental monitoring of forest quality, soil erosion or water 
regulations, even though PFES targets improvements across these environmental services. Focusing 
on increasing forest cover also means that no incentives are built into the scheme for forest 
managers to enhance forest quality. The government of Vietnam selected forest cover as the proxy 
for environmental services in the PFES scheme because it is easy for them to collect these data. 
However, this approach makes it difficult to identify clear links between actions and the 
environmental services provided (e.g., whether improving forest cover leads to improved water 
quality). Even when PFES does result in the improved conservation of forests, that additional 
forested area may not yield additional environmental services because ecosystem function is not 
the same as the provision of environmental services, even though the scientific literature and the 
general public often equate them (Sills et al., 2006). It therefore remains unclear, for example, 
whether an increase in forest cover will cause an increase in the provision of water. Indeed, this 
might happen, for example, with native forest conservation, or may even decrease with alternative 
forms of reforestation. Watershed protection is often based on the assumption that reforestation 
of areas upstream of dams benefit hydrologically by protecting hydroelectric dams from siltation; 
however, further research is still needed to confirm whether such reforestation is the optimal land-
use strategy to yield those corresponding benefits (Wunder et al., 2005).  
Our study also shows that determining additionality of PFES in improving social conditions and 
local livelihoods is challenging because socioeconomic data before PFES is unavailable and data after 
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PFES are not regularly or systematically collected by responsible agencies. However, the 
intermediate impacts of PFES at the village level in the case studies showed that PFES has had little 
impact on individual households, limited due to the small areas of forests under their control. 
Although communities have access to increasing PFES revenue, as villagers were already active in 
protecting community forests as part of local social norms, our study shows that PFES has created 
little additionality in incentivizing people to take additional actions in community forest protection. 
Nevertheless, our study does show that the impact of PFES for the poor might be considerable as 
the program prioritizes all poor households can gain access as PFES beneficiaries. At the current 
juncture, the government of Vietnam only assesses the impact of PFES based on the number of poor 
households benefitting and participating in the PFES scheme and how many people have overcome 
poverty due to PFES. However, the assessment is merely based on income and net impacts 
determined via single poverty measures, whereas human well‐being is complex and multifaceted 
(McGregor, 2007). 
Our findings also show that PFES payments to households in studied sites is rather low and does 
not serve as a strong enough financial incentive to motivate people to take part in the PFES scheme, 
particularly when firewood harvesting/bamboo plantations or other production-oriented activities 
would generate more income than PFES. Importantly however, according to many households 
interviewed, PFES payment levels might be low, but if they are regular and a continuous source of 
income, they would still be interested in engaging in PFES. However, the fact that only a small 
number of households receive continuous PFES payments over time not only reflects the failure of 
PFES to maintain and increase existing forest areas but also highlights the weaknesses in the 
permanence of PFES. Moreover, as Pham et al., (2013) pointed out, combining monetary and non-
monetary benefits such as granting forest land use right certificates has been used by Son La 
government authorities to attract engagement of local people in the PFES scheme.  
Finally, although this study adopts a Before – After – Control – Intervention approach to analyze 
additionality of PFES, this method can only be accurate and carried out at the village level. 
Nevertheless, the fact that publicly available data at the village level does not exist in Vietnam nor 
is systematically and regularly collected poses challenges for assessing PFES impact. Projects might 
collect data on PFES at the village level as our study has done, but there is a lack of systematic 
national monitoring and evaluation framework to track PFES impact at this level. Diversifying 
monitoring and evaluation approaches might be coupled with participatory monitoring approaches 
to engage local communities.  
5. Conclusion 
Overall, the intent of our research is not to throw the baby out with the bathwater on PFES in 
Vietnam, but rather to point to potential ways to better understand its processes and better 
evaluate its impacts. Indeed, PFES can provide an additional layer of protection to forests and 
livelihood support to rural communities that might not have previously been there. In this paper, 
we have focused on the many facets of assessing impacts of PFES in Vietnam, at once presenting 
the most detailed longitudinal assessment to date, while also pointing to potential ideas for 
improving monitoring and evaluation systems going forward.  
Our research shows clearly that assessing PFES impact in Vietnam is politically and technically 
challenging. Environmental impact of PFES in Vietnam is still debatable and depends on scale, unit 
of measurement, data collection, as well as which data sources were used to evaluate impact. 
Proving additionality of PFES in intervention sites where there are multiple programs is especially 
challenging. While assessing environmental impact of PFES poses difficulties, findings also show 
minor impacts of PFES on improving individual household income, but significant impact on 
generating funding for community forestry. Vietnam’s experience in implementing PFES highlights 
the need to combine both monetary and non-monetary benefits to incentivize landowners to 
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engage in forest protection. As payment levels are rather small in most cases, combining multiple 
forest protection programs and livelihood improvement programs might create stronger incentives 
and support for local people to take part in conservation schemes, although this will make 
demonstrating PFES impact and its additionality more challenging.  
Building on national capacities for assessing and tracking PFES impacts that involve the 
participation of multiple actors can serve to establish more rigorous impact assessments of PFES in 
the future. The current PFES monitoring and evaluation system that focuses on forest cover is an 
encouraging starting point, but further efforts are required to improve the tracking and monitoring 
of PFES impact on forest quality and poverty reduction. Strengthening monitoring and evaluation 
systems for PFES does not only require adequate funding devoted to monitoring and application of 
advanced technology, but also understanding and addressing the underlying politics embedded in 
data collection and reporting processes, which is also essential for determining the accuracy of PFES 
impact. Addressing these politics will require strong political commitment from within the 
government of Vietnam but are also contingent upon more active presence and participation of 
non-state actors to enhance PFES transparency. 
 Our findings also suggest that the impact of PFES schemes depend upon who assesses it and 
their political interests in producing the results. Therefore, establishing independent and 
participatory monitoring and evaluation systems where environmental services providers, 
environmental users, the public, and civil society can take participate, and enhanced through the 
support of advanced technologies will also help to ensure better transparency and accountability of 
PFES.   
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